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ABSTRACT
The Seventh Circuit created a circuit split in bankruptcy law regarding the rejection of trademark
licenses in its 2011 decision in Sunbeam Prods., Inc. v. Chi. Am. Mfg. LLC. All other courts have
held that when a trademark license is rejected under 11 U.S.C. § 365 in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy
proceeding, the licensee may no longer use the licensed trademark. All other forms of intellectual
property are subject to § 365(n), which prevents automatic termination of the licensee’s rights.
In Sunbeam, the court held that the rejection of a trademark license under § 365 does not
automatically terminate the licensee’s rights. The court held that Congress’ omission of trademarks
from § 365(n) did not automatically mean that trademark licensee rights were exhausted after a
rejection. An analysis of the history of the rejection of trademark licenses during bankruptcy
proceedings reveals that the underlying reason for the circuit split arises from a larger circuit split
regarding interpretation of the term “rejection” in § 365(g) of the Bankruptcy Code. This split has
been around for at least twenty-eight years and a 1997 committee report requested that Congress
clarify the term through an amendment. Congress has not yet clarified the term and the Supreme
Court has not granted any writs of certiorari on the matter. This article therefore proposes the
employment of a multi-factor test when a contract is rejected that takes into consideration the
concerns of each side of the split. This article proposes further factors for consideration when the
contract is a trademark license, which addresses the quality control concerns that led Congress to
omit trademarks from § 365(n) in the first place. The employment of a multi-factor test allows a
more equitable solution to be reached without waiting for Congress or the Supreme Court to take
action.
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A SOLUTION-BASED APPROACH TO REJECTING TRADEMARK LICENSES IN BANKRUPTCY
CHANDRA J. CRITCHELOW, PH.D.*
I. INTRODUCTION
With the downturn in the economy and living costs skyrocketing, more people
have turned to cheaper alternatives for vacationing. Imagine that STARBUCKS™
and an up-and-coming camping gear manufacturer (“UCM”) have decided to
capitalize on the situation.
The two companies teamed up to create a
STARBUCKS™ line of coffee equipment, tea equipment, and drink wares suitable for
camping. After negotiations, STARBUCKS™ and the UCM entered into a trademark
licensing agreement. The licensing agreement contained several provisions including
extensive quality control measures on the STARBUCKS™ logos that would go on the
wares and for the quality of the wares themselves. The UCM negotiated the
agreement to be five years instead of the two years that STARBUCKS™ wanted,
because the UCM expected profits only after the end of the second year. To ensure it
would reach those profits, the UCM included a provision in the agreement that
prevented STARBUCKS™ from entering into another agreement with a competitor
during the term of the agreement.
Two years into the agreement, STARBUCKS™ found itself in great financial
difficulties because the economy had continued to decline and its consumers were
opting to make coffee from home with generic coffee beans to save money.
STARBUCKS™ had no option but to file for bankruptcy. By this time, the UCM had
just recouped its investment and was about to start making a profit from the
STARBUCKS™ line of camping wares.
During the Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings for reorganization,
STARBUCKS™ decided that it could make more money from royalties by
terminating the licensing agreement with the UCM and creating a license agreement
with a larger manufacturer instead. Therefore, STARBUCKS™ rejected the UCM’s
license agreement, which terminated the UCM’s right to use any STARBUCKS™
trademarks. The UCM had no recourse because it had just recouped its investment
on the project. It also had no capital to start a new project because it had spent all of
its capital on the STARBUCKS™ line. To make matters worse, the UCM had
already made tens of thousands of wares that were stocked and ready to be sold. It
could no longer sell them because of the rejection. To avoid huge losses, the UCM did
not create any more of the STARBUCKS™ products, but continued to sell what was
in stock. Within the next several weeks, the UCM received a complaint alleging
trademark infringement.
This bankruptcy situation does not happen with other forms of intellectual
property licenses because of specific provisions within the Bankruptcy Code.1 With
© Chandra J. Critchelow, Ph.D. 2009. J.D. Candidate May 2015, The John Marshall Law School.
Dr. Critchelow graduated with a B.S. in chemical engineering in 2002 and graduated with a Ph.D. in
the biological sciences sub-group of molecular biophysics in 2009.
1 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(35A), 365(n)(1)(B)(i) (2012). Bankruptcy proceedings are subject to Title 11
of the United States Code, termed the “Bankruptcy Code.” Bankruptcy, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1532
*
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patents, trade secrets, and copyrights, the debtor may reject the licensing contract,2
but the rejection has no automatic termination effect on the rights given by the
license.3 With trademarks, all jurisdictions except the Seventh Circuit treat a
trademark licensee’s right to use a trademark as automatically terminated when a
debtor-licensor rejects the contract during bankruptcy.4 This article focuses on why
trademark licenses are treated differently within bankruptcy proceedings and
proposes a more equitable solution. Part II of the article discusses the peculiar
history leading up to the trademark license discrepancy and the recent case that
caused a circuit split on the issue. Part III analyzes the trademark discrepancy in
bankruptcy proceedings and determines the root cause of it. Part IV proposes the
incorporation of a “rejection” test for executory contracts involving property, or
something with characteristics of property, as an alternative to waiting for an
amendment by Congress or opinion from the Supreme Court.
II. BACKGROUND
The STARBUCKS™ situation comes from a unique intersection of three
separate areas of law: (1) trademarks, (2) licenses, and (3) bankruptcy. Each of
these areas of law is complex in and of itself, creating a complex problem when all
three are forced to merge in an area of law such as bankruptcy proceedings with
intellectual property licenses.5 Section II.A will give a brief explanation of how these
areas of law tie together and will help illustrate the underlying problem trademark
licensees currently face when a licensor proceeds through the bankruptcy process.
Section I.B will then discuss the cases giving rise to the current circuit split on
whether a trademark licensee rights are automatically terminated after a debtor
rejects the license.

(2012). 11 U.S.C. § 101 defines the term “Intellectual Property” to include patents, copyrights, and
trade secrets, but not trademarks. 11 U.S.C. § 101(35A) (2012). 11 U.S.C. § 365(n) prevents
intellectual property licenses (except for trademark licenses) from being automatically terminated
when an executory contract is rejected by a debtor or trustee. 11 U.S.C. § 365(n).
2 11 U.S.C. §§ 365(a), 1107(a). With intellectual property licenses, a “debtor” refers to either an
appointed trustee, or a debtor-in-possession with the same rights during bankruptcy proceedings as
a trustee. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(13), 1101(1).
3 11 U.S.C. § 365(n) (2012). With patent, copyright, and trade secret licenses, if the licensee
prefers to retain the license for the remainder of the term, it may do so. 11 U.S.C. § 365(n)(1)(B)(i).
See Peter M. Gilhuly, Kimberly A. Posin, & Ted A. Dillman, Intellectually Bankrupt?: The
Comprehensive Guide to Navigating IP Issues in Chapter 11, 21 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 1, 34
(2013) (“[W]hen a debtor-licensor seeks to reject a license of patents, copyrights or trade secrets, the
licensee has the right to keep the license in place.”).
4 See Gilhuly, Posin, & Dillman supra note 3, at 47.
5 See ERIC E. BENSEN, COLLIER GUIDE TO CHAPTER 11:
KEY TOPICS AND SELECTED
INDUSTRIES ¶ 10.04[1] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds. 2013) [hereinafter COLLIER
GUIDE] (“The most difficult questions concerning intellectual property matters to arise in
bankruptcy do so in the context of the intellectual property license.”).
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A. The Intersection of Bankruptcy, Contract, and Trademark Laws
As indicated by its statutory definition, a trademark is something used with a
good to identify or distinguish the good and to indicate its source.6 While a
trademark can be “any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof,”7
it may alternatively be many other things such as a color,8 a sound,9 or packaging.10
A trademark’s function is to “induce[] a purchaser” to choose a particular good or
product based on its source.11 Trademarks became a legally recognized form of
intellectual property through the Lanham Act of 1946,12 and as with all forms of
intellectual property, a trademark owner’s rights include licensing of the property to
a third party.13
A trademark license is a form of contract between two parties in which the
licensor grants the licensee the right to manufacture, use, distribute, and sell
products with the licensor’s mark, typically in return for royalties from the licensee.14
Licensing can be a “win-win” situation for both the licensor and the licensee,15 but

15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012).
Id.
8 1 ANNE GILSON LALONDE, GILSON ON TRADEMARKS § 2.11[2][a] (Matthew Bender, rev. ed.
2013) [hereinafter GILSON ON TRADEMARKS]; Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159,
161 (1995) (holding that a color alone could satisfy both ordinary requirements for trademark
registration and use under the statutory definition).
9 1 GILSON ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 8, § 2.11[6]; Oliveira v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 251 F.3d 56, 61
(2d Cir. 2001) (“We can see no reason why a musical composition should be ineligible to serve as a
symbol or device to identify a person’s goods or services.”).
10 1 GILSON ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 8, § 1.02[1][a] (Product packaging is protected as a
trade dress, a type of nontraditional trademark.).
11 See Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S. S. Kresge, 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942) (“A
trade-mark is a merchandising short-cut which induces a purchaser to select what he wants, or
what he has been led to believe he wants.”).
12 The Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1141 (2012).
The Lanham Act contains the federal
statues for trademark law. Id.
13 See Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen, Bankrupting Trademarks, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1267, 1274 n.30
(2004); Beech-Nut Packing Co. v. P. Lorillard Co., 273 U.S. 629, 632 (1927) (“[T]he mark is property,
protected and alienable, although as with other property its outline is shown only by the law of torts,
of which the right is a prophetic summary.”).
14 See Irene Calboli, The Sunset of “Quality Control” in Modern Trademark Licensing, 57 AM.
UNIV. L. REV. 341, 343 (2007) (“[Trademark licensing is] where trademark owners authorize third
parties to produce and distribute products under their marks, usually in exchange for royalties”).
Trademark licenses can be either exclusive or nonexclusive. ROGER MILGRIM & ERIC BENSEN, 2
MILGRAM ON LICENSING § 11.03 (Matthew Bender rev. ed. 2013) [hereinafter MILGRIM ON
LICENSING] (“[a]s is true in any other type of license, a trademark license can be exclusive or
nonexclusive”); Gilhuly, Posin, & Dillman, supra note 3, at 6 (discussing that intellectual property
licenses can be exclusive or nonexclusive). In many commercial uses, the licenses are non-exclusive
because trademark owners use the licenses to expand into new markets without incurring the costs
of producing the goods themselves. JAY DRATLER, JR., LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
§ 1.03[1]-[9] (Law Journal Press 2013) [hereinafter LICENSING OF IP] (discussing reasons for
licensing intellectual property).
15 Calboli, supra note 14, at 343 (“Without exaggeration, licensing today interests most
products, represents a significant source of revenue for many trademark owners, and continues to
grow in importance due to the changes in product manufacturing, the internationalization of trade,
and the shift toward a service economy.”) (internal citation omitted).
6
7
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can quickly become a “win-lose” situation when one party encounters financial
difficulties and files for bankruptcy.16
When a business enters bankruptcy, it is typically commenced as a final effort to
avoid going out of business completely.17 Two options exist when a business is in
financial failure; it can file for either chapter 7 or chapter 11 bankruptcy.18 Chapter
7 bankruptcies involve liquidation of assets to pay creditors,19 and are not available
to banks or insurance companies.20 Chapter 11 bankruptcies involve mechanisms for
reorganization of the business with the goal of the business emerging from financial
failure.21 It is within the chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings that the issue with
trademark licenses, a type of contract, is found.
Part of the chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings is for the debtor to file
information about any executory contracts the debtor has.22 No definition for an
executory contract exists in the title 11 Code,23 but it is widely accepted that an
executory contract is one where both parties still have some performance due.24
Although this may seem straightforward, there is contention over the level of
underperformance required for the contract to be considered executory.25 Many
courts have held that a material breach is required for a contract to be considered

16 In re Matusalem, 158 B.R. 514, 522 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1993) (noting that the effect of a
licensor going bankrupt could “utterly destroy” a licensee’s business when a trademark license is at
issue).
17 ELIZABETH WARREN, CHAPTER 11: REORGANIZING AMERICAN BUSINESSES xiii (Vicki Been et
al. eds., Aspen Publishers 2008) (“Failing businesses can file a petition in bankruptcy, give
themselves some breathing room, and take a final chance to save their businesses.”). The federal
laws found in title 11 of the United States Code govern both types of bankruptcy for businesses,
Chapter 11 and Chapter 7. The Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1532 (2012).
18 COLLIER GUIDE, supra note 5, ¶ 109.03[1] (stating that corporations and partnerships are
eligible for liquidation, known as Chapter 7 bankruptcy); id. ¶ 109.05 (stating that Chapter 7
partnerships and corporations are alternatively eligible for reorganization, known as Chapter 11
bankruptcy).
19 Id. ¶ 700.01 (stating that Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code handles the sales of a debtor’s
property to pay creditors “a form of relief afforded by the bankruptcy laws that involves the
collection, liquidation and distribution of the nonexempt property of the debtor”).
20 11 U.S.C. § 109(b) (2012) (excluding railroads, banks, and insurance companies from being
debtors under Chapter 7 bankruptcy).
21 COLLIER GUIDE, supra note 5, ¶   1.02[1] (explaining that rehabilitating a business is
preferred over termination, because businesses are tied to the economy and termination will impact
many people and entities including employees, stockholders, creditors, and customers).
22 11 U.S.C. § 1007(b)(1)(C) (stating that a debtor under Chapter 11 proceedings must file
information related to “schedules, statements, and other documents” for “executory contracts and
unexpired leases”).
23 Peter S. Menell, Bankruptcy Treatment of Intellectual Property Assets:
An Economic
Analysis, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 733, 755 (2007) (stating that the term “executory contract” is “not
specifically defined in the [Bankruptcy] Code”); Madlyn G. Primoff & Erica G. Weinberger, ECommerce and Dot-Com Bankruptcies: Assumption, Assignment, and Rejection of Executory
Contracts, Including Intellectual Property Agreements and Related Issues Under Sections 365(c),
365(e), and 365(n) of the Bankruptcy Code, 8 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 307, 310 (2000) (“[T]he term
‘executory contract’ is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code.”).
24 Menell, supra note 23, at 755 (commenting that most courts follow the notion that an
executory contract is one where both parties still have performance due).
25 Id. at 755–56 (discussing that courts use different tests to determine whether a contract is
executory depending on the jurisdiction).
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executory (the “Countryman” test).26 For example, the Ninth Circuit follows the
Countryman test, holding that a contract is executory when “the obligations of both
parties are so far unperformed that the failure of either party to complete
performance would constitute a material breach and thus excuse the performance of
the other.”27 Other courts have held that a contract is executory if making it
executory is in the best interest of the debtor and there is some performance due
beyond payment of money (the “functional” test).28
Whether or not the contract is considered executory is of great importance to
both the debtor and the other party to the contract. Under the Bankruptcy Code,
executory contracts and non-executory contracts have different procedures the debtor
must follow.29 The primary difference is that when the contract is executory the
debtor has the option to reject it, but when the contract is non-executory the debtor
may not reject it.30 Rejection of a contract has significant legal effect because the
debtor is relieved of remaining obligations, and the non-debtor’s remedy becomes a
breach of contract claim beginning at the time the bankruptcy action was initiated.31
The practical effect of this with a trademark license, when the licensor is the debtor,
is that the licensee must stop using the trademark immediately and any claims must
be brought as a pre-bankruptcy breach of contract claim.32 This breach of contract
claim is treated as a general unsecured claim,33 meaning that the licensee must prove
any damages,34 and even if it can prove damages, it may receive little, if any,
recovery.35 To make matters even grimmer for a licensee, once the debtor rejects a
26 Id. at 755; see also Vern Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy Law: Part I, 57
MINN. L. REV. 439, 460 (1973).
27 See, e.g., In re Wegner, 839 F.2d 533, 536 (9th Cir. 1988).
28 Sipes v. Atl. Gulf Cmtys. Corp. (In re Gen. Dev. Corp.), 84 F.3d 1364, 1375 (11th Cir. 1996)
(holding that the Eleventh Circuit prefers the “functional approach” over the “Countryman
approach”); In re Jolly, 574 F.2d 349, 351 (6th Cir. 1978) (deciding that whether a contract is
executory depends on the purpose of rejecting the contract); In re Arrow Air, Inc., 60 B.R. 117, 122
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1986) (holding that a contract is allowed to be “executory under the functional
approach if its assumption or rejection would ultimately benefit the estate and its creditors”).
29 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (2012) (stating a trustee or debtor may “assume or reject any executory
contract”); 11 U.S.C. § 365(n) (expressing that a debtor may assume or reject an intellectual
property license, but if the debtor rejects it, the licensee may choose to continue the license or allow
the rejection); Gilhuly, Posin, & Dillman, supra note 3, at 2 (2013) (noting that the Bankruptcy Code
treats executory contracts differently from ones that are nonexecutory).
30 Gilhuly, Posin, & Dillman, supra note 3, at 2–3.
31 11 U.S.C. § 365(g)(1) (2012) (“the rejection of an executory contract or unexpired lease of the
debtor constitutes a breach of such contract or lease . . . [taking place] immediately before the date of
the filing of the petition”); Aslan v. Sycamore Inv. Co., 909 F.2d 367, 371 (9th Cir. 1990) (discussing
that when an executory contract is rejected, § 365(g)(1) from the Bankruptcy Code applies, creating
a breach of contract beginning on the day before the petition for bankruptcy was filed).
32 See Menell, supra note 23, at 767 (noting that when an executory contract is rejected, the
effect is that “section 365(g) of the Code provides that the debtor is deemed to have breached the
agreement, giving rise to a pre-petition damages claim for breach of contract”).
33 NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 531 (1984) (“Damages on the contract that result
from the rejection of an executory contract, as noted, must be administered through bankruptcy and
receive the priority provided general unsecured creditors.”).
34 See Gilhuly, Posin, & Dillman, supra note 3, at 36 (“[I]f the rejection damages claim is
unliquidated, the licensee may have to further litigate to establish the amount of its claim.”).
35 See id. (“[R]ejection damages are treated as pre-petition unsecured claims under section
502(g), which have a relatively low priority in bankruptcy and generally will not be paid in full.”).
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contract and the court has approved the rejection, the licensee is barred from any
specific performance remedies.36
B. The Rise of the Circuit Split
It seems inequitable that a debtor may “pull the rug out” from under a licensee
as just described, especially when the debtor is the root cause of the breach.
However, after the seminal case by the Fourth Circuit, Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc. v.
Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc.,37 this was exactly what courts held for all forms of
intellectual property.38 In Lubrizol, the court held that a patent licensor going
through bankruptcy could reject a license agreement through 11 U.S.C. § 365,
resulting in the licensee being unable to use the licensed property or to seek specific
remedies.39 The Lubrizol court also opined that even though the result of the
rejections was unfair to the licensees, it was not the court’s place to remedy the laws
that allowed it.40
Other courts followed the Fourth Circuit’s holding until Congress enacted the
Intellectual Bankruptcy Protection Act of 1988 (“IPBPA”) in response to lobbying by
the U.S. Department of Commerce.41 The IPBPA was later codified into the
Bankruptcy Code as § 365(n).42
This section of the Code creates rights for
intellectual property licensees if the debtor chooses to reject the license agreement
during bankruptcy.43 Under this section, if the debtor rejects the license agreement,

36 Kaonohi Ohana, Ltd. v. Sutherland, 873 F.2d 1302, 1306 n.5 (9th Cir. 1989) (“Specific
performance of a rejected executory contract cannot be required.”) (citing In re Pac. Express, Inc.,
780 F.2d 1482, 1486 n.3 (9th Cir. 1986)); Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc. v Richmond Metal Finishers,
Inc., 756 F.2d 1043, 1048 (4th Cir. 1985) (holding that specific performance is barred, leaving
monetary damages as the only option); Menell, supra note 23, at 768 (“The Bankruptcy Code bars
the remedy of specific performance for a rejected executory contract.”).
37 Lubrizol Enters., Inc. v Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043, 1048 (4th Cir. 1985).
The Lubrizol court recognized that allowing debtor-licensors of intellectual property licenses to
reject these contracts “imposes serious burdens” and makes parties wary of entering such contract,
but that Congress is responsible for the law being written this way. Id.
38 In re Chipwich, Inc., 54 B.R. 427, 431 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985) (allowing unilateral rejection of
a trademark license by a licensor going through Chapter 11 bankruptcy even though it meant the
licensee could no longer use the licensor’s trademark); In re Logical Software, 66 B.R. 683, 687
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1986) (holding that software licensor could unilaterally reject software license
basing its decision on Lubrizol).
39 See Menell, supra note 23, at 769.
40 Lubrizol, 756 F.2d at 1048.
41 S. REP. NO. 100-505, at 11–13 (1988) [hereinafter REPORT 100-505] (basing its decision in
part on a U.S. Department of Commerce letter that expressed concern over the “chilling effect” that
allowing unilateral rejection of technology licenses in bankruptcy proceedings would have on
willingness of others to invest in and enter into licensing contracts).
42 11 U.S.C. § 365(n) (2012).
43 Gilhuly, Posin, & Dillman, supra note 3, at 35 (discussing the fact that § 365(n) of the
Bankruptcy Code protects intellectual property licensees during a licensor’s bankruptcy because the
provision “operates to shield the non-debtor licensee or sublicensee from the consequences of the
debtor’s rejection”); Primoff & Weinberger, supra note 23, at 339 (“[§ 365(n)] seeks to protect the
licensee without unduly burdening the debtor-licensor’s estate” when an intellectual property
technology license is involved and the debtor is the licensor.).
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the licensee can choose to retain the agreement or to reject the agreement.44 If both
the licensor and licensee choose to reject the agreement, then the licensee can go
through § 365(g) and bring a general unsecured breach of contract claim against the
licensor, just like what would happen before the IPBPA.45 Although the end result is
the same as before the IPBPA,46 it is the licensee who now chooses to pursue this
route. Alternatively, if the licensee chooses to retain the agreement, then the
licensor’s rejection of the agreement allows the licensee to continue using the license
and to continue to pay royalties to the licensor for the remainder of the agreement’s
term.47 Retaining the agreement does not mean that the agreement continues just as
it did before the bankruptcy, rather it is changed to allow continuation of the license
but remove other future obligations in the contract.48
Courts feel this change has created a more equitable situation for intellectual
property licensees involved with a licensor going through bankruptcy.49 However,
44 11 U.S.C. § 365(n)(1) (2012) (stating that an intellectual property licensee who is subject to
licensor’s rejection of an executory contract during a bankruptcy proceeding can either also reject
the contract leading to termination, or retain the license).
45 See Gilhuly, Posin, & Dillman, supra note 3, at 35 (noting that in a § 365(n) situation, a
licensee may “(1) treat the debtor’s rejection as termination of the license and assert a claim for
rejection damages, or (2) retain its rights to use the IP as they existed as of the filing of the
bankruptcy petition”); Menell, supra note 23, at 772 (“the licensee can either treat the rejection as a
breach giving rise to a potential claim for money damages under section 365(g), as with other
rejected contracts, or retain the rights to the intellectual property covered by the license”).
46 Primoff & Weinberger, supra note 23, at 339–40 (explaining that when the licensee also
rejects a license under § 365(n)(1)(A) the licensee is in the same position as any other nonintellectual property contract rejection licensee); Menell, supra note 23, at 772 (“[a] licensee
can . . . treat the rejection as a breach giving rise to a potential claim for money damages under
section 365(g), as with other rejected contracts”).
47 11 U.S.C. § 365(n)(2)(B) (2012); Primoff & Weinberger, supra note 23, at 340 (explaining that
when a licensee retains a rejected intellectual property executory contract, “the licensee must pay all
future ‘royalties’ due to the licensor under the contract”); Menell, supra note 23, at 772 (“Where the
licensee elects to retain rights to the intellectual property, the debtor must permit the licensee to
exercise its rights and the licensee must continue to pay royalties due under the licensing
agreement.”).
48 Biosafe Int’l v. Controlled Shredders (In re Szombathy), Nos. 94 B 15536, 95 A 01035, 1996
Bankr. LEXIS 888, at *28 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. July 9, 1996) (commenting that when an intellectual
property licensee chooses to retain its rights after a debtor-licensor’s rejection under § 365(n)(1)(B),
the licensee may continue to use rights it was given in the contract, but the debtor is relieved of
affirmative obligations after bankruptcy commenced); Barbara C. Brown, Craig D. Hansen, &
Thomas J. Salerno, Technology Licenses Under Section 365(n) of the Bankruptcy Code: The
Protections Afforded by the Technology User, 95 COM. L.J. 170, 185 (1990) (making a distinction
between rights that are retained by the licensee after rejection of an intellectual property license
that is governed by § 365(n), such as use and exclusivity provisions, and the termination of further
performance obligations by the debtor-licensor); Menell, supra note 23, at 772 (“By rejecting the
licensing agreement, the debtor is relieved from performing any affirmative duties under the
contract.”).
49 Encino Bus. Mgmt. v. Prize Frize (In re Prize Frize), 32 F.3d 426, 428 (9th Cir. 1994)
(opining that § 365(n) of the Bankruptcy Code has “struck a fair balance” between a bankrupt
licensor’s interests and a licensee’s interests because the licensor cannot terminate the license for
the originally agreed upon term, but the licensor cannot use the license without paying for the
right); Novon Int’l v. Novamont S.P.A. (In re Novon Int’l), Nos. 98-CV-0677E(F), 96-BK-15463B,
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5169, at *14 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2000) (citing In re Prize Frize and agreeing
that § 365(n) of the Bankruptcy code is a “fair balance” for licensors and licensees); Biosafe, 1996
Bankr. LEXIS 888, at *26–27 (citing to In re Prize Frize and agreeing that § 365(n) has tried to
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the IPBPA of 1988 omitted trademarks from the definition of intellectual property.50
This appears to have been done consciously by Congress with the intent of addressing
trademarks at a later time.51 Congress has not addressed the trademark issue since,
resulting in courts holding that trademark licenses are not subject to the intellectual
property license exception to licensor rejections during bankruptcy proceedings.52
This means that trademark licensee rights are still being unilaterally terminated by
a licensor going through bankruptcy.53
There have only been a few discussions on this inequitable treatment of
trademark licensees through the courts since the enactment of the IPBPA. The first
occurred in 1993 with In re Matulasem, in which a Florida bankruptcy court noted
that continuing the Lubrizol holding for trademark licensees was probably
inequitable.54 In 2002, a California bankruptcy court held that because Congress had
omitted trademarks from the definition of “intellectual property” in § 365(n),
trademark licensees did not have the right to use a licensor’s mark after a licensor
had rejected a trademark licensing agreement under § 365(g).55 More recently, a
concurring opinion in the Third Circuit discussed how the legislative intent of the
IPBPA of 1988 indicated that trademark licensees should be given equitable
treatment when the debtor has rejected a trademark license under § 365(g).56 The
“evenly balance” the licensor and licensee’s rights when an intellectual property license is at issue
and it is the licensor who is proceeding through bankruptcy).
50 11 U.S.C. § 101(35)(A) (2012) (defining “intellectual property” as a trade secret, patent,
patent application, plant variety, work of authorship, or mask work); COLLIER GUIDE, supra note 5,
¶ 10.04[3][c][iii][C] (“[A] major shortcoming of section 365(n) for licensees is that it does not cover
trademark licenses.”).
51 REPORT 100-505, supra note 41, at 5 (1988) (“the bill does not address the rejection of
executory trademark, trade name or service mark licenses . . . such contracts raise issues beyond the
scope of this legislation. . . . [I]t was determined to postpone congressional action in this area.”).
52 Raima UK Ltd. v. Centura Software Corp. (In re Centura Software Corp.), 281 B.R. 660, 669
(Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2002) (“The plain language of the statute, however, indicates that § 365(n) does
not include trademark licenses.”); In re HQ Global Holdings, Inc., 290 B.R. 507, 513 (Bankr. D. Del.
2003) (“Trade names, trademarks, and other proprietary marks are expressly excluded from the
definition of ‘intellectual property.’ As a result, the Franchisees are not protected by section
365(n).”) (internal citation omitted).
53 HQ Global Holdings, 290 B.R. at 513 (finding that a trademark license in the form of a
franchise agreement was executory and that § 365(n) did not protect the licensees from unilateral
rejection of the agreement); Raima, 281 B.R. at 674 (determining that the licensee of a trademark is
not given protection under § 365(n), resulting in termination of the license and the licensee could
only file a general unsecured claim for damages after the rejection of the contract by the debtorlicensor).
54 In re Matusalem, 158 B.R. 514, 522 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1993) (noting it did not make sense to
allow a combined trade secret and trademark license to undergo executory contract rejection by the
debtor-licensor because under § 365(n) for the trade secret and § 365(g) for the trademark the
licensee would still be able to sell the product, but without the label). The court held that a
trademark license for a rum label could not be terminated by the bankrupt licensor through an
executory rejection because the agreement was part of larger agreement that included a trade secret
license. Id. at 515, 522.
55 Raima, 281 B.R. at 669–70 (making its decision that trademarks were unprotected by
§ 365(n) because “Congress has deliberately limited § 365(n) protection only to the intellectual
property enumerated by the statute [and] has expressly withheld § 365(n) protection from rejected
executory trademark licenses”) (internal citation omitted).
56 In re Exide Techs., 607 F.3d 957, 967 (3d Cir. 2010) (Ambro, J., concurring) (agreeing in the
judgment but writing separately because “the Courts here should have used, I believe, their

[13:621 2014]

A Solution-Based Approach to
Rejecting Trademark Licenses in Bankruptcy

631

majority opinion did not address this issue, because the case focused instead on
whether the contract was executory.57
The first real break for trademark licensees came from the Seventh Circuit in
2011 in the case Sunbeam Prods., Inc. v. Chi. Am. Mfg. LLC.58 The court held that
even though the license had been rejected under § 365(a) by the licensor, the rejection
did not terminate the rights in the license.59 The court rejected the In re Matusalem
holding that Congress did not intend to give trademark licensees the same treatment
as other intellectual property licensees.60 It also expressly rejected the reasoning in
the Third Circuit concurring opinion that trademark licensees should be able to
continue using rights in the licenses after rejection based on equitable grounds.61
Instead, the Sunbeam court based its holding on the reasoning that when Congress
left trademarks out of the IPBPA of 1988, it was only an omission, not an affirmation
of the Lubrizol holding for trademarks.62 The Seventh Circuit’s holding created a
circuit split,63 and as the case was denied certiorari by the Supreme Court, there has
been no resolution yet.64
III. ANALYSIS
An appropriate resolution for the circuit split depends on first determining why
trademarks were excluded from the IPBPA and why the split developed in the first
equitable powers to give Exide a fresh start without stripping EnerSys of its fairly procured
trademark rights”).
57 Id. at 964 (majority opinion) (“[W]e have determined that the Agreement is not an executory
contract because it does not contain at least one ongoing material obligation for EnerSys. Because
the Agreement is not an executory contract, Exide cannot reject it.”).
58 Sunbeam Prods., Inc. v. Chi. Am. Mfg., LLC, 686 F.3d 372, 378 (7th Cir. 2012).
59 Sunbeam, 686 F.3d at 377.
[R]ejection is not “the functional equivalent of a rescission, rendering void the contract
and requiring that the parties be put back in the positions they occupied before the
contract was formed.” . . . It “merely frees the estate from the obligation to perform” and
“has absolutely no effect upon the contract’s continued existence.”
Id. (quoting Thompkins v. Lil’ Joe Records, Inc., 476 F.3d 1294, 1306 (11th Cir. 2007)) (internal
citation omitted). The Seventh Circuit holding created a circuit split on how to handle licensordebtor rejections of trademark licenses. Gilhuly, Posin, & Dillman, supra note 3, at 47.
60 See Sunbeam, 686 F.3d at 375 (“Some bankruptcy judges have inferred from the omission
that Congress codified Lubrizol with respect to trademarks, but an omission is just an omission.”).
The Seventh Circuit then opines on the absence of trademarks from the definition of “intellectual
property” of the Bankruptcy Code. Id. (“The limited definition in § 101(35A) means that § 365(n)
does not affect trademarks one way or the other. According to the Senate committee report on the
bill that included § 365(n), the omission was designed to allow more time for study, not to approve
Lubrizol.”) (citing to REPORT 100-505, supra note 41, at 5 (1988)).
61 Sunbeam, 686 F.3d at 375 (“What the Bankruptcy Code provides, a judge cannot override by
declaring that enforcement would be ‘inequitable.’”).
62 Id. (“Some bankruptcy judges have inferred from the omission that Congress codified
Lubrizol with respect to trademarks, but an omission is just an omission.”).
63 Gilhuly, Posin, & Dillman, supra note 3, at 47 (“The Sunbeam decision creates a circuit
split.”).
64 Sunbeam Prods. v. Chi. Am. Mfg., LLC, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 9472, at *1 (U.S. Dec. 10, 2012).
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place. First, this section will probe into the factors contributing to the exclusion of
trademarks from the IPBPA. Next, it will investigate how the courts have
interpreted the absence of trademarks from the IPBPA. Finally, this section will
determine the root cause of the circuit split.
A. Factors Underlying Trademark Exclusion from the Definition of Intellectual
Property in the IPBPA
Two factors contribute to the exclusion of trademarks from the IPBPA: (1) the
conflicting policies for trademark laws, and (2) the requirement of quality control by
the trademark owner in trademark laws. The conflicting policies for trademark laws
will be addressed first. Unlike copyright and patent laws, which share constitutional
origins,65 trademark law originated from the growth of the manufacturing industry
and concerns for consumer protection.66 The two main policies in trademark law
have a tendency to compete against each other outside of infringement actions.67 The
first policy is to protect consumers from confusion and deception, and the second
policy is to protect trademark owners from infringement.68
At least one scholar has noted that differences in policies between trademarks
and other forms of intellectual property may have factored into why trademarks
required further investigation before defining them as “intellectual property” in the
Bankruptcy Code.69 Patents, copyrights, and trade secrets are all defined as
“intellectual property”.70 The primary policies for patents and copyrights are to spur
65 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.”).
66 The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 93–94 (1879) (holding that a federal trademark statute
enacted in 1870 was unconstitutional because Congress did not have power under article 1 section 8
of the Constitution to regulate trademarks). Instead, federal trademark laws evolved out of
interstate business and manufacturing practices. United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248
U.S. 90, 97 (1918) (commenting that trademark law stemmed from unfair competition laws, that a
trademark arises from use rather than adoption of it, and that trademark laws serve the dual
purpose of designating the source of a product while protecting the mark owner’s goodwill); Menell,
supra note 23, at 741 (2007) (describing that federal trademark law has evolved through the
Commerce Clause in the Constitution).
67 S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 3 (1946).
The report states there are two competing policies in
trademark law:

One is to protect the public so it may be confident that, in purchasing a product bearing
a particular trade-mark, which it favorably knows, it will get the product which it asks
for and wants to get. Secondly, where the owner of a trade-mark has spent energy, time,
and money in presenting to the public the product, he is protected in his investment from
its misappropriation by pirates and cheats.
Id.

Id.
Nguyen, supra note 13, at 1297–1300 (discussing the similarities and differences between
policies with different forms of intellectual property and concluding that it is possible that the
reason for exclusion of trademarks from the Bankruptcy Code’s definition of intellectual property
may be due to quality control, which is based on trademark policy concerns).
70 11 U.S.C. § 101(35A) (2012). According to the statute,
68
69
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innovation by giving inventors and creators legal protection of their works.71 Trade
secrets policy is also rooted in protecting innovations.72 In contrast, trademark laws
are directed at protecting consumers and the owner’s established goodwill.73
Comparison at this level indicates that policy could have factored into the omission of
trademarks from the “intellectual property” definition in the Bankruptcy Code,
because consumer protection and protection of goodwill is different from protecting
innovations. However, on a broader level all of these policies share the same goal,
protecting creations. For patents, the policy is aimed at protecting the creation of
inventions. Copyright policy protects the author’s creation of a work of art.74 The
policy for trade secrets protects the creation of formulas and formula-like
information.75 The common theme of these intellectual property policies is to protect
the creation of the property itself. Similarly, trademark policy includes protecting
the creation of brand recognition.
Regardless of the fact that all intellectual property has a goal of protecting
creations, trademark law has evolved to put more stringent restrictions on the
licensing of trademarks. To help satisfy the narrower goals of protecting consumers
and a trademark owner’s goodwill, trademark laws specify that a mark’s validity
depends on the owner’s control of the quality associated with the mark.76 However,
what constitutes sufficient “quality” or “control” is not defined in the statutes.77 As a

The term “intellectual property” means—
(A) trade secret;
(B) invention, process, design, or plant protected under title 35;
(C) patent application;
(D) plant variety;
(E) work of authorship protected under title 17; or
(F) mask work protected under chapter 9 of title 17;
to the extent protected by applicable nonbankruptcy law.
Id.

71 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 1 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 6:3 (4th
ed. 2013) [hereinafter MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS] (“‘Unlike a patent, copyright gives no exclusive
rights to the art disclosed; protection is given only to the expression of the idea—not to the idea
itself.’ Patent law deals with the concept of functional and design inventions, in order to encourage
investment in new technology and invention.”) (quoting Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954).
72 PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, No. 94 C 6838, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19437, at *87 (N.D. Ill. Jan.
26, 1995) (“The maintenance of standards of commercial ethics and the encouragement of invention
are the broadly stated policies behind trade secret law.”).
73 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 71, § 6.3 (“[T]he purpose of trademark and trade
dress law is to prevent customer confusion and protect the value of identifying symbols, not to
encourage invention by providing a period of exclusive rights.”).
74 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
75 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757, cmt. b (1939) (“A trade secret may consist of any
formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is used in one’s business, and which
gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it.”).
76 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 71, § 2:4 (explaining that the requirement of quality
creates protection of consumers by encouragement of product or service uniformity, and aids
protection of trademark owners from infringers). “Control” is only important in trademark licensing
situations. Id. § 7:6.
77 Calboli, supra note 14, at 345 (“Unfortunately, like the judiciary before its adoption, the
statute neither provided a definition of ‘quality’ and ‘control’ nor indicated how much control must
be used for licensing to be valid.”).
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result, judicial interpretations of the terms have been different depending on the
jurisdiction,78 and when in time the cases were decided.79 This has led to a lot of
confusion and debate over the level of “quality control” necessary for a trademark to
retain protection.80 Legislators explicitly noted the troubling intersection of quality
control with trademark licenses and bankruptcy law:
the bill does not address the rejection of executory trademark, trade name
or service mark licenses by debtor-licensors. While such rejection is of
concern because of the interpretation of section 365 by the Lubrizol court
and others, such contracts raise issues beyond the scope of this legislation.
In particular, trademark, trade name and service mark licensing
relationships depend to a large extent on control of the quality of the
products or services sold by the licensee. Since these matters could not be
addressed without more extensive study, it was determined to postpone
congressional action in this area and to allow the development of equitable
treatment of this situation by bankruptcy courts.81
The legislative branch has not addressed this concern since the report was written,82
resulting in an unresolved area of law.
The problem is the lack of consensus on an adequate amount of “control” over
“quality” that a trademark owner must maintain over a licensee, such that the mark
remains protected. This particular problem stems from trademark law rather than
bankruptcy law.83 Supporters of the quality control requirement for trademark
licenses argue that its absence could cause consumer confusion and affect product or
service quality.84
Insufficient quality control can lead to cancellation or
78 Id. (commenting that the lack of statutory definition of quality control has led to
contradictory decisions stemming from interpretations on a case-by-case basis).
79 Id. at 346.

In particular, courts progressively relaxed the interpretation of the control that licensors
must exercise over their licensees and held that first “adequate,” then “sufficient,” and
then “minimal” control was sufficient to fulfill the statutory requirement. In some
instances, courts also declared that evidence of control was unnecessary as long as
product quality remained consistent and the public was not deceived.
Id.

80 See MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 71, § 18:55 (“Because of the wide range of types
of licensing encompassed within the legal rule requiring ‘adequate’ quality control, the reported
decisions appear inconsistent and difficult to reconcile.”); Calboli, supra note 14, at 345 (noting that
a case-by-case approach to what constitutes quality control “has often led to contradictory decisions
and uncertainty as to what constitutes a valid license”).
81 REPORT 100-505, supra note 41, at 5 (1988) (internal citation omitted).
82 Sunbeam Prods., Inc. v. Chi. Am. Mfg., LLC, 686 F.3d 372, 375 (7th Cir. 2012) (noting that
after the IPBPA of 1988, the further study to look into defining trademarks as “intellectual
property” in the Bankruptcy Code “seems to have fallen off the legislative agenda”); Calboli, supra
note 14, at 351 (“[N]either the courts nor the statute have provided a definition of ‘quality control’ or
any guidance as to how to interpret the requirement.”).
83 See MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 71, § 18:50 (discussing that quality control is
part of the requirements for trademark licensing under federal trademark laws).
84 Calboli, supra note 14, at 352; F. Vern Lahart, Control—The Sine Qua Non of a Valid
Trademark License, 50 TRADEMARK REP. 103, 104, 107, 134 (1960). Quality control is important for
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abandonment of the trademark,85 and could make the mark’s owner liable for
defrauding the public.86
Although legislators singled out quality control as a problematic area in
bankruptcy and trademark law,87 courts have since changed the level of control
required for legal sufficiency to account for the evolution of how trademarks are used
within a business.88 Courts have lessened what is considered sufficient quality
control over the years because trademark licensing has become a major aspect in
business practices.89 Specifically, trademark licensing has shifted from a traditional
sense90 to use of trademark licenses for promoting a brand or entity.91 The modern
standard for quality control for most courts is that only some evidence of quality
control is required.92 The quality control requirement is met even in the absence of
contractual language, so long as some evidence of actual control is present.93 Even
protecting consumers and making sure that only marks that identify a particular source are being
used:
[w]ithout such control, it has been argued, product quality could be affected and
consumers could be confused. In addition, allowing licenses without control would
facilitate trademark owners’ trading in their marks as “things,” thus limiting the
availability of words and symbols available as marks for competitors to identify similar
products.
Calboli, supra note 14, at 352.
85 Calboli, supra note 14, at 356 (discussing the effects of a trademark license being declared
invalid, stating, “In addition to trademark cancellation, invalid licenses can also lead to
abandonment of the licensed mark.”).
86 Id. (“Failure to control their licenses reasonably can also render trademark owners liable for
false advertising under the Federal Trade Commission Act when the licensees use the marks as
instruments to defraud the public.”); MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 71, § 18:48 (citing to
Waltham Watch Co. v. FTC, 318 F.2d 28, 29, 32 (7th Cir. 1963)).
87 REPORT 100-505, supra note 41, at 5 (1988).
88 Calboli, supra note 14, at 364–67 (discussing the history of quality control interpretations
over time, noting that in general courts have decreased the requirements for control and that some
modern courts use an even lesser standard of “minimal” control).
89 Id.
90 See id. at 348, 365 (describing that traditional licensing involved outsourcing production of
goods to a licensee). Licensing of trademarks in the traditional sense included the requirement that
the mark continued to be “associated with the same product or business with which it ha[d] become
associated in the public mind.” E. F. Prichard Co. v. Consumers Brewing Co., 136 F.2d 512, 519 (6th
Cir. 1943).
91 See Calboli, supra note 14, at 349 (describing modern trademark licensing as also including
types such as collateral licensing (mark on different but related products or services) and
promotional licensing (mark on unrelated products or services)); David J. Franklyn, Toward a
Coherent Theory of Strict Tort Liability for Trademark Licensors, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 14 (1998) (“In
promotional licensing, the trademark functions primarily as an advertising tool, not as an indicator
of the physical source of the goods or that the goods are of the same quality as all other goods
bearing the same mark.”).
92 Ky. Fried Chicken Corp. v. Diversified Packaging Corp., 549 F.2d 368, 387 (5th Cir. 1977)
(holding minimal control over quality of products with a trademark license is sufficient to satisfy the
quality control requirement of the Lanham Act); Calboli, supra note 14, at 367 (stating that most
courts have found “licensing valid as long as trademark owners exercised some control over their
licensees”).
93 Embedded Moments, Inc. v. Int’l Silver Co., 648 F. Supp. 187, 194 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (“It is not
necessary, however, for the licenses themselves to contain a written provision for control; actual
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when no evidence of quality control is present, some courts have held that such
control is implied so long as the public is not misled and product quality is
consistent.94 While some courts still adopt a stricter standard,95 the modern trend
shows a general acceptance that in a licensing scenario, quality control means a
trademark owner monitoring the product quality and use of the mark.96 The
modernization of quality control requirements with trademark law should be
considered when determining whether trademarks should now be included in the
definition of “intellectual property” under the IPBPA.97
B. The Sunbeam Court’s Interpretation of “rejection” Regarding Trademark Licenses
Courts have interpreted the absence of trademarks from the IPBPA differently
depending on the jurisdiction. This may be due in part to the youthfulness of both
trademark law and modern bankruptcy law. Modern bankruptcy law evolved out of
legislative reform with The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.98 Legislative recognition
of federal trademark laws did not even begin until enactment of The Lanham Act in

control by the licensor is sufficient.”); Printers Servs. Co. v. Bondurant, No. CV 91-0916 JSL (Sx),
1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20561, at *14 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 1991) (“Quality control is adequate, even in
the absence of any written provision, when the licensor relied upon the integrity of the licensee to
fulfill the requirement, and no customer complaints are received.”).
94 See Land O’Lakes Creameries, Inc. v. Oconomowoc Canning Co., 330 F.2d 667, 670 (7th Cir.
1964) (holding that even though licensor had relied on licensee for quality control, the relationship
had been ongoing for forty years without any quality complaints, which was sufficient evidence of
quality control); Calboli, supra note 14, at 371 (stating that some courts that have held no evidence
of quality control is required if product quality is consistent).
95 See, e.g., Heaton Enters. of Nev., Inc. v. Lang, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d 1842, 1847 (T.T.A.B. 1988)
(holding that the trademark license was invalid because it did not contain any quality control
provisions in the contract and there was no evidence of quality control being performed).
96 Taco Cabana Int’l, Inc. v. Two Pesos, Inc. 932 F.2d 1113, 1121 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that
the quality control requirement is met when parties to the license have a close working relationship,
rely on each other for consistent quality, and “no actual decline in quality standards is
demonstrated”); Transgo, Inc. v. Ajac Transmission Parts Corp., 768 F.2d 1001, 1017–18 (9th Cir.
1985) (determining that there was sufficient quality control to prevent abandonment of a licensor’s
trademark when the components were made by the licensor, the licensee manufactured the product
with the components, and no quality complaints had been received during the licensing agreement);
Land O’Lakes, 330 F.2d at 670 (affirming the district court judge’s decision that the quality control
requirement was met when the licensor’s name appeared on the product and there had been no
complaints about the quality of the goods during the forty years the licensing agreement had been
going on); Calboli, supra note 14, at 371 (“Because of the ambiguities surrounding the concept of
‘control’ and, in particular, of what represents ‘adequate’ control, the past decades have also
witnessed a shift in focus directly onto product quality, rather than on control, to assess the validity
of trademark licensing.”).
97 See Nguyen, supra note 13, at 1310–14 (proposing that trademarks should be included in the
definition of trademarks with inclusion of a provision in § 365(n) that requires quality control
practices to be maintained throughout the term of the remainder of the license agreement).
98 Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3 AM. BANKR.
INST. L. REV. 5, 32 (1995) (“The [Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978] is unique in the history of the
nation's bankruptcy legislation in that it was the first major enactment that was not enacted as a
response to a severe economic depression. The Bankruptcy Code governs bankruptcy law in the
United States today.”).
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1946.99 It is likely that the immaturity of these two legal areas created prime
circumstances for different judicial interpretations to appear, particularly where the
two areas happen to intersect.
For the purposes of this article, only the differences in decisions regarding
trademark licenses during bankruptcy are discussed. All courts except one have
refused any protection for trademark licensees in bankruptcy proceedings after a
debtor has rejected a license, interpreting the omission of trademarks from the
definition of “intellectual property” as proof that legislators affirmed Lubrizol’s
holding for trademarks.100 In Sunbeam, the Seventh Circuit took a different
approach.101 The court instead interpreted the omission of trademarks from the
definition of “intellectual property” as neither favoring nor disfavoring the Lubrizol
holding.102 It focused on determining what the consequences were of a rejection
under § 365(g) of the Bankruptcy Code.103 The court explicitly stated:
What § 365(g) does by classifying rejection as a breach is establish that in
bankruptcy, as outside of it, the other party’s rights remain in place. After
rejecting a contract, a debtor is not subject to an order of specific
performance . . . . The debtor’s unfulfilled obligations are converted to
damages; when a debtor does not assume the contract before rejecting it,
these damages are treated as a pre-petition obligation, which may be
written down in common with other debts of the same class. But nothing
about this process implies that any rights of the other contracting party
have been vaporized.104

99 Ethan Horwitz & Benjamin Levi, Fifty Years of the Lanham Act: A Retrospective of Section
43(a), 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 59, 60 (“Prior to the Lanham Act, federal
trademark statutes were largely ineffective and had limited success.”).
100 See e.g., Lewis Bros. Bakeries Inc. v. Interstate Brands Corp. (In re Interstate Bakeries
Corp.), 690 F.3d 1069, 1072, 1075 (8th Cir. 2012) (affirming that the trademark license was
executory and so rejection by the debtor terminated the licensee’s use of the trademark); Licensing
by Paolo, Inc. v. Sinatra (In re Gucci), 126 F.3d 380, 393–94 (2d Cir. 1997) (allowing rejection of a
trademark license and stating that trademarks are not permitted to have § 365(n) protections); In re
Old Carco LLC, 406 B.R. 180, 211 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (holding that since trademarks are
excluded from the Bankruptcy Code’s definition of intellectual property, trademarks are not part of
the § 365(n) protections and so the licensee’s right to use the trademark is terminated); In re
Blackstone Potato Chip Co., 109 B.R. 557, 562 (Bankr. D. R.I. 1990) (ordering termination of
licensee’s use of a trademark after licensor rejected the trademark license during bankruptcy
proceedings); Gilhuly, supra note 3, at 45 (describing the effects of post-Lubrizol courts regarding
bankrupt trademark licensors, “leav[ing] trademark licensees with pre-petition claims for damages
caused by the rejection (as with any other non-IP executory contract), while allowing the debtorlicensor to sell its trademark free and clear of the licensee’s interests in the trademark under the
license agreement.”).
101 Sunbeam Prods., Inc. v. Chi. Am. Mfg., LLC, 686 F.3d 372, 378 (7th Cir. 2012).
102 Sunbeam, 686 F.3d at 375 (“Some bankruptcy judges have inferred from the omission that
Congress codified Lubrizol with respect to trademarks, but an omission is just an omission.”).
103 Id. (“We need to determine whether Lubrizol correctly understood § 365(g), which specifies
the consequences of a rejection under § 365(a).”).
104 Id. at 376 (internal citations omitted).
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The court then explained that rejection of a contract is not equivalent to
rescission of a contract.105 It claimed that other sections of the Bankruptcy Code
handle if and when a debtor can rescind a contract.106 Based on this explanation, the
court stated that the Lubrizol court “confuse[d] rejection with the use of an avoiding
power.”107 The Seventh Circuit affirmed the Bankruptcy Court’s decision that the
trademark licensee could continue to use the debtor-licensor’s trademark even
though the debtor’s trustee had rejected the trademark license.108 However, it
rejected the Bankruptcy Court’s reasoning behind the decision.109
The Sunbeam court’s rationale can be summarized into four parts. First, the
rejection of an executory contract by a debtor-licensor under § 365(g) of the
Bankruptcy Code should be interpreted as a breach of contract, not a termination of
it.110 Second, a licensor’s breach of an intellectual property contract generally does
not terminate a licensee’s right to use the intellectual property.111 Third, the
Sunbeam court makes the assumption that an intellectual property license is a type
of intellectual property contract, although it never explicitly states this
assumption.112 Therefore, when a debtor-licensor rejects an intellectual property
license during a bankruptcy proceeding it should result in the licensor breaching the
contract.113 Finally, the licensee’s right to use the intellectual property does not
automatically terminate, because a breach of contract is not equivalent to the
termination of the rights given by the contract.114

105 Id. at 377 (“[R]ejection is not ‘the functional equivalent of a rescission, rendering void the
contract and requiring that the parties be put back in the positions they occupied before the contract
was formed.’”) (quoting Thompkins v. Lil’ Joe Records, Inc., 476 F.3d 1294, 1306 (11th Cir. 2007)).
106 Id. (explaining that trustees (or debtors) have alternative pathways to get out of contracts
specified by the Bankruptcy Code).
107 Id.
108 Id. at 378 (“Because the trustee’s rejection of Lakewood’s contract with CAM did not
abrogate CAM’s contractual rights, this adversary proceeding properly ended with a judgment in
CAM’s favor.”).
109 Id. at 376 (“Although the bankruptcy judge's ground of decision is untenable, that does not
necessarily require reversal.”).
110 Id. at 377 (concluding that rejection is not equivalent to rescission).
111 Id. (“What §365(g) does by classifying rejection as breach is establish that in bankruptcy, as
outside of it, the other party’s rights remain in place.”).
112 Note that this is speaking of intellectual property license-contract relationships in general,
not the narrower “intellectual property” definition supplied by the Bankruptcy Code. It is merely an
inference the Sunbeam court relies upon without explicitly stating it.
113 This is inferred from the case because the Sunbeam court is claiming that a trademark
license, like any non-intellectual property contract, should fall under the proceedings governed by
§ 365(g), which if deemed an executory contract and then rejected by the debtor, results in a prepetition breach of contract.
114 Sunbeam, 686 F.3d at 376–77.
The Sunbeam court explains that when any executory
contract is breached due to a rejection by the debtor:

[t]he debtor’s unfulfilled obligations are converted to damages; when a debtor does not
assume the contract before rejecting it, these damages are treated as a pre-petition
obligation, which may be written down in common with other debts of the same class.
But nothing about this process implies that any rights of the other contracting party
have been vaporized.
Id.

[13:621 2014]

A Solution-Based Approach to
Rejecting Trademark Licenses in Bankruptcy

639

C. Root Cause of the Circuit Split on Treatment of a Post-Rejection Trademark License
During Bankruptcy
In light of the Sunbeam court’s rationale, the root cause of the circuit split lies in
the interpretation of the § 365(g) Bankruptcy Code. More specifically, the circuit
split grew from differing judicial interpretations regarding the effect of an executory
contract rejection under § 365(g).115 However, the scope of this split goes beyond
rejections of trademark licenses, it pertains to non-intellectual property licenses and
leases as well.116 The Sunbeam court follows courts that interpret rejection under §
365(g) to mean that a breach of contract has occurred, which means that rights
present in the contract have not been terminated.117 Some of these courts also stress
that rejection and avoidance are separate sections under the Bankruptcy Code, and
so a debtor wanting termination of a contract should seek relief under the avoidance
sections of the Code, not the rejection sections.118 Conversely, other courts interpret
rejection under § 365(g) as terminating the contract under federal law.119 Following
this type of reasoning, breach of contract is used for pre-petition damages only
because rights in the contract are terminated with the rejection.120 The Lubrizol
115 See id. at 377 (“What §365(g) does by classifying rejection as breach is establish that in
bankruptcy, as outside of it, the other party’s rights remain in place. . . . [N]othing about this
process implies that any rights of the other contracting party have been vaporized.”). The Sunbeam
court’s holding applies the reasoning that rejection of an executory contract under § 365(g) does not
result in termination of the contract and therefore does not result in termination of rights given in
the contract. Other courts use an opposite reasoning that the rejection of an executory contract has
the same effect as terminating it, resulting in termination of any rights that were given in the
contract. See, e.g., Lubrizol Enters., Inc. v Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043, 1048 (4th
Cir. 1985) (holding that the rejection of a contract under § 365 of the Bankruptcy Code only allows
for the non-debtor to collect monetary damages resulting from breach of contract, and that any
rights granted by the contract are terminated).
116 See e.g., Eastover Bank for Sav. v. Sowashee Venture (In re Austin Dev. Co.), 19 F.3d 1077,
1082–83 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that a real property lease rejected by the lessor during bankruptcy
proceedings did not result in termination of the rights given in the lease, only a breach of the
contract by the lessor); Cohen v. Drexel Burnham Lambert Grp., 138 B.R. 687, 703 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1992) (describing the interpretation of a § 365(g) rejection, when a bankrupt employer rejected an
employment contract, as “the term ‘rejection,’ a product of the exclusionary doctrine does not
embody the contract-vaporizing properties so commonly ascribed to it”).
117 See Sunbeam, 686 F.3d at 376–77.
118 Cohen, 138 B.R. at 709 (“‘Rejection is not itself an avoiding power. Rights in property that
arise from a contract may, however, be terminated by bankruptcy law’s normal avoiding powers.’”)
(quoting Michael T. Andrew, Executory Contracts Revisited: mA Reply to Professor Westbrook, 62 U.
COLO. L. REV. 1, 17 (1991) [hereinafter Andrew, Reply to Westbrook]); Eastover, 19 F.3d at 1083
(“While the Bankruptcy Code expressly authorizes avoidance of certain liens and other preferential
rights against the debtor, the avoidance power read into § 365 is, uncharacteristically, an implied
authority.”) (internal citation omitted) (citing to Michael T. Andrew, Executory Contracts in
Bankruptcy: Understanding “Rejection”, 59 U. COLO. L. REV. 835, at 901–02 (1988) [hereinafter
Andrew, Understanding Rejection]).
119 See, e.g., Blackstone Potato Chip Co, Inc. v. Mr. Popper, Inc. (In re Blackstone Potato Chip
Co., Inc.), 109 B.R. 557, 562 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1990).
120 In re HQ Global Holdings, Inc., 290 B.R. 507, 513 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003) (“In other words,
since the Bankruptcy Code does not include trademarks in its protected class of intellectual
property, Lubrizol controls and the Franchisees’ right to use the trademarks stops on rejection.”)
(citing to Raima UK Ltd. v. Centura Software Corp. (In re Centura Software Corp.), 281 B.R. 660,
673 n.24 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2002)); Blackstone, 109 B.R. at 562 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1990).
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court followed this line of reasoning when it held that a trademark licensee’s right to
use the mark was terminated after a debtor-licensor rejected the contract under
§ 365(g).121
IV. PROPOSAL
The judicial split interpreting the term “rejection” in § 365 of the Bankruptcy
Code must be settled. Currently, whether rights exist for a non-bankrupt party after
the rejection of an executory contract is jurisdiction dependent. Trust in the federal
legal system depends in part on uniform decisions across all jurisdictions.122 The
split can be resolved by either: (1) amending § 365 of the Bankruptcy Code, (2)
interpreting of the term “reject” within § 365 uniformly across jurisdictions, or (3)
employing a test that takes into consideration the concerns that led to the split.
A. Option 1: Amendment to the Bankruptcy Code.
An amendment to § 365 by Congress could be done either by defining the term
“rejection,” or by including trademarks in the definition of “intellectual property.”
Narrowly amending the definition of “intellectual property” under § 101(35A) to
include trademarks has been previously proposed.123
Those who adhere to
traditionalist notions of trademark law may state that allowing trademarks to be
defined as property is “inconsistent with the historical focus of trademark law on the
protection of consumers from confusion and deception.”124 These sentiments are
without merit as the Supreme Court has clearly stated that trademarks are
considered a legally recognizable type of property.125 However, others will rightfully
argue that merely including trademarks in the definition without addressing quality
control fails to address the quality control concern raised by Congress.126 To address

121

1985).

Lubrizol Enters., Inc. v Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043, 1048 (4th Cir.

122 See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (“[T]he twin aims of the Erie rule [are]
discouragement of forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws.”)
(referring to the case that gave rise to the Erie doctrine) (Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938)); COLLIER GUIDE, supra note 5, ¶ 4.02[2][b] (explaining that forum shopping is prevalent in
Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings with large corporations). It is a common legal principle that a
federal judicial system should have consistent outcomes, regardless of where the case is being heard,
otherwise forum shopping results.
123 Nguyen, supra note 13, at 1310 (“In light of both the changing role of trademarks in the
Internet economy and the integration of trademarks with other protected intellectual property in
licensing arrangements, the IPLBA should be amended to include trademarks within its
protections.”) (internal citations omitted).
124 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, supra note 71, § 2:1.
125 Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 673 (1999)
(explaining that provisions of the Lanham act “protect constitutionally cognizable property
interests—notably, its provisions dealing with infringement of trademarks, which are the ‘property’
of the owner because he can exclude others from using them”).
126 REPORT 100-505, supra note 41, at 5 (1988) (discussing that trademarks were not included
in the definition of intellectual property in the Bankruptcy Code because the quality control
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this, an additional provision in § 365(n) is needed to require trademark licensees to
maintain the quality of the product or service throughout the debtor-licensor’s
bankruptcy process or to the end of the license’s term.127 While this narrow approach
fixes the immediate problem with trademarks, it is merely a temporary solution, like
the § 365(n) provision itself. It perpetuates the misnomer that a debtor rejecting a
contract is equivalent to terminating a contract except for where Congress has made
explicit provisions.128 So, while this approach is a possible solution, it is not the best
one.
The best solution is to fix the root of the problem, which means defining the
word “rejection” in the Bankruptcy Code. Defining “rejection” merely requires
Congress to state whether a rejection of an executory contract under § 365
terminates contract rights automatically or not. A 1997 bankruptcy committee
proposed the following amendment to Congress, but for an unknown reason, it was
never adopted:
The concept of “rejection” in section 365 should be replaced with “election to
breach.”129
If Congress rejected this proposal because it had instead intended a § 365 “rejection”
to be a termination of the rights in a contract, the following amendment is proposed:
The concept of “rejection” in section 365 should be replaced with “election to
terminate.”
The initial amendment would prevent rejection of an executory contract during
Chapter 11 bankruptcy from automatically terminating rights as well as any other
contract. The other amendment would specify that such a rejection was an automatic
termination of rights in the contract.
Even though Congress did not adopt the initial amendment after it was
proposed, it is the more correct amendment. Critics may point to the absence of
adoption as a basis to say the other amendment is the correct one. However, this
basis is unfounded because it ignores the most likely reason the first amendment was
requirements for trademark protection warranted further investigation, which was outside the scope
of the bill at that time).
127 Nguyen, supra note 13, at 1314 (“Congress should explicitly amend the IPLBA to impose on
trademark licensees the obligation to continue, for the remainder of the term of the license
agreement, the quality control standard to which the licensees have agreed.”).
128 NAT’L BANKR. REV. COMM’N, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS, § 2.4.2, at 464 (1997)
[hereinafter BANKRUPTCY] (purporting that the existing Bankruptcy Code leads to contrary holdings
and results in Congress continually adding provisions, and that rejection is equivalent to “election to
breach”).
129 Id. at 453. The commission was allocated $1.5 M by Congress, “to investigate and study
issues relating to the Bankruptcy Code, to solicit divergent views on the operation of the bankruptcy
system, to evaluate the advisability of proposals, and to prepare a report.” Id. § I.A at 47. The
committee found that “the concept of rejection has been applied inconsistently by the courts, and has
led to the numerous special interest amendments to section 365.” Id. § 2.4.2 at 460. The committee
advocated that rejection was not meant to be an avoiding power during bankruptcy and so did not
terminate the rights in a contract when a debtor or trustee chose to reject a contract. Id. at 460–61,
n.1116.
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not adopted. If Congress were to adopt the initial amendment, it would have to
overhaul the existing Bankruptcy Code to prevent further confusion. The committee
report that proposed the initial amendment alluded to this, but it failed to elaborate
on what else was required or to propose a solution.130 This amendment essentially
nullifies the additional special provisions for particular industries Congress kept
putting in whenever a court interpretation on the subject got public attention.131 If
Congress fails to remove those when it adopts the amendment, the change may just
cause additional confusion.132 This means that Congress would have to set up an
additional committee to investigate and propose how to remedy the rest of the
Bankruptcy Code before it could incorporate the amendment.
Congress’
apprehension at spending more time and money on another committee to do this was
the most likely cause of the failed adoption of the initial amendment—not because it
did not agree with the amendment. Congress should determine the changes that
need to be made to the existing code so that “rejection” can be replaced with “election
to breach.” Doing this will clarify bankruptcy laws and improve the uniformity of
bankruptcy case outcomes.
However, it seems unlikely that Congress will revisit the “rejection” amendment.
Congress was given a report in 1997, more than fifteen years ago, explaining that the
term “rejection” needed clarification, along with explanations and a recommended
solution.133 Yet nothing has been done.

130 Id. at 463 (noting that the amendment alone could be seen an inadequate solution because
it does not address the existing provisions, and that it is up to Congress to decide whether the
provisions are still required or can be removed).
131 See id. (“It is Congress’ prerogative to consider whether this package of amendments
vitiates the need for several of the subsections of section 365 that apply only to one type of industry
or contract.”). Commentators have noted that Congress has added provisions to § 365 since the 1978
enactment of the modern Bankruptcy Code, each time as an adverse reaction to judicial rulings that
rejection was equivalent to termination. See e.g., Andrew, Reply to Westbrook, supra note 118, at 11
(“Every time Congress has been presented with the consequences of the avoiding-power rejection
doctrine in a particular context, it has disapproved the doctrine with a specific provision.”).
132 See BANKRUPTCY, supra note 128, § 2.4.1, at 463 (bringing up a potential concern if the
word “rejection” was replaced with the term “election to breach” stating, “[T]he proposed changes
call into question the interpretation of the complicated, industry-specific provisions that remain in
section 365.”).
133 Id. § 2.4.1, at 460–61.
The bankruptcy committee was tasked to find areas of the
Bankruptcy Code that were problematic and to make recommendations to fix the problem:

The Commission recommends a common-sense clarification of the term “rejection” by
replacing it with “election to breach.” The Commission further recommends that the
Bankruptcy Code delineate the consequences of electing to breach to correct on a generic
basis the contrary results reached by some courts. The bankruptcy trustee’s election not
to perform a contract is nothing more or less than a breach of the contract and should be
treated accordingly. Rejection does not “nullify,” “rescind,” or “vaporize” the contract or
terminate the rights of the parties; it does not serve as an avoiding power separate and
apart from the express avoiding powers already provided in the Bankruptcy Code.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
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B. Option 2: A Uniform Interpretation of “Rejection.”
Although not the best solution, creation of a uniform judicial interpretation of
“rejection” would also remedy the problem. A Supreme Court decision would be the
most straightforward way to have uniform court interpretation. If the Court takes
up a case for review, it should determine the meaning of the term “rejection” before
determining whether a trademark licensee can continue to use a trademark after the
license has been rejected. This is because the interpretation of “rejection” will apply
to all licenses, including trademark licenses. As described in Section II, the Supreme
Court could adopt one of two general interpretations for “rejection.”134 One
interpretation holds that rejection is the same as termination of contract rights.135
The other interpretation holds that rejection is only a breach of contract and
therefore rights remain in place.136
Is one a more correct interpretation than the other? Both sides have valid
reasons for their views.137 Perhaps the best answer is that both are correct, at least
for contracts involving leases or licenses. Instead of trying to choose which of two
See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 115 & 119 and accompanying text.
136 Andrew, Reply to Westbrook, supra note 118, at 2 (explaining the points of agreement with
Westbrook about the meaning of rejection under § 365, stating, “[W]e agree that rejection does not
cancel, repudiate, or terminate contracts; that no preliminary test of the ‘executoriness’ of a contract
is necessary as a pre-condition to its rejection; and that rejection does not, like bankruptcy law's
‘avoiding powers,’ terminate state-law rights in or to specific property.”) (internal citation omitted).
137 See Andrew Reply to Westbrook, supra note 118, at 2 (“rejection does not cancel, repudiate,
or terminate contracts”). Andrew argues that based on the history surrounding enactment of
§ 365(g) of the modern Bankruptcy Code, § 365(g) is codification of earlier Supreme Court decisions
that created a presumption that not assuming a contract was a breach of contract. Id. at 5–,8.
Westbrook argues a slightly different reason; rejection of a contract is not termination of it because
the rights of a trustee do not allow it. Jay Lawrence Westbrook, A Functional Analysis of Executory
Contracts, 74 MINN. L. REV. 227, 230 (1989). He argues that a trustee only has the same rights as a
debtor, which is to breach a contract or fulfill it, and that the plain meaning of § 365(g) says
rejection is a breach, so rejection under this section cannot be equivalent to termination. Id. at 244.
See also Andrews, Understanding Rejection, supra note 118, at 922 (stating that five arguments
have been purported for why revocation is an automatic termination in the Bankruptcy Code). One
argument is that property rights and contracts are different, and contract rights do not survive
rejection. Id. at 922–23 (explaining that this argument is based on the notion that licenses do not
transfer property rights, and so are not afforded the same protection as real property). A second
argument is that specific performance is prevented under bankruptcy law, and allowing licensees to
use a product after rejection is forcing specific performance on the debtor-licensor. Id. at 924–25
(explaining that a common basis for treating a § 365 rejection as termination is rooted in an
interpretation of bankruptcy policy for remedies available to a non-debtor). A third argument is
that when the licensee’s future breach of contract claim includes a possible remedy of specific
performance, it fits into the Bankruptcy Code’s definition of “claim” which results in it being
dischargeable. Id. at 926–27 (noting that this argument is related to specific performance, but that
this argument is instead rooted in the interpretation of the word “claim” in the Bankruptcy Code
§ 101(4)(B)). A fourth argument is that because Congress created special provisions preventing
termination, it is negatively inferred that in all other situations Congress intends rejection to be
equivalent to termination. Id. at 928 (stating that the negative inference argument stems from the
fact that Congress created express provisions that do not allow a rejection to be termination in
particular circumstances). The fifth argument is that treating rejection as termination furthers the
end goal of Chapter 11 bankruptcy, which is to rehabilitate the debtor. Id. at 929 (contending that
courts that see rejection as termination often use this argument to explain why they allow rejection
as termination).
134
135
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valid, but opposing, arguments is the “correct” one by creating a single
interpretation, the underlying reasoning for each interpretation can be incorporated
into a multi-factor test. The outcome then depends on the type of contract involved
and the circumstances surrounding the parties, which may be a more equitable
solution. Critics may argue that a multi-factor test still allows for different court
interpretations and therefore doesn’t resolve the split. However, this type of test
allows for the competing considerations leading to the split to both be taken into
account before making a court makes a determination. This could lead to more
consistent outcomes for licenses and leases, the primary victims of rejection
decisions.138 This approach is also immediately applicable because it does not require
waiting for years or decades for an opinion from the Supreme Court or an
amendment from Congress. A multi-factor test would allow immediate resolution of
the “rejection” interpretation split that has been around for at least twenty-eight
years.139
C. Option 3: Employ a Multi-Factor Test to Balance the “Rejection” Interpretations.
The following factors are proposed to reconcile the conflicting meanings of
“rejection” within the Bankruptcy Code for executory contracts: (1) whether the
contract involves a license or lease for property, or something with the characteristics
of property, (2) the benefit to the debtor and the trustee of treating the rejection as
termination of the contract, (3) the detriment to the non-debtor by treating the
rejection as termination of the contract, and (4) the intent of the debtor or trustee in
seeking rejection of the contract.
1. Licenses and Leases
The “rejection” test should be used when a contract involves a lease or license.
Contracts involving leases, licenses, and real property are subjects already explicitly
protected from rejections being treated as automatic termination of rights given by a
contract.140 All of these subjects involve the situation in which a remedy of only
monetary damages would be an insufficient remedy for the non-debtor because of the
uniqueness of the right given. It is therefore important to know whether a contract
fits into this category of exceptions. Any contract that gives a unique right or a
unique property to the non-debtor should be subject to the “rejection test” factors.
This is because other types of contracts can be remedied through monetary damages

138 See 11 U.S.C. § 365 (2012) (creating provisions preventing the automatic termination of
rights for many types of licenses and leases when a debtor rejects an executory contract).
139 See Andrews, Understanding Rejection, supra note 118, at 848 (explaining that the term
“rejection” needs to be defined because courts are interpreting the term differently). The split on
rejection has been around since at least the time of the Lubrizol decision. Lubrizol Enters., Inc. v.
Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043, 1048 (4th Cir. 1985).
140 11 U.S.C. § 365 (2012).
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by existing bankruptcy proceedings.141 The above test should also be applied to other
situations where an agreement exists and monetary damages may be insufficient.
Expanding the test to other situations that generate a unique right when the
agreement is made will prevent the need for § 365(n)-like amendments in the
Bankruptcy Code.
2. Benefits of Terminating the Agreement
While the first factor of the “rejection test” ensures that situations similar to
special provisions existing in § 365 are considered, this factor takes into account the
concern that debtors and trustees should be given leeway to make decisions based on
what will be best to rehabilitate the debtor.142 It accounts for both the benefits to the
debtor when an agreement is terminated and the debtor-friendly bankruptcy policy of
giving debtors flexibility to get out of existing contracts.143 A subset of factors
ensures this bankruptcy policy is accounted for. These factors include: (1) whether
the license or lease is exclusive; (2) the obligations required of the debtor and trustee
for the license or lease to continue; and (3) the detriment of continuing the license or
lease to the debtor and trustee.
Whether or not a license is exclusive can impact how detrimental retaining it
can be to the debtor or trustee. When a license is exclusive, the debtor cannot try to
increase revenue for the estate by licensing out the trademark to additional parties.
This may impair the debtor from emerging from bankruptcy. The less the
impairment, the less weight this sub-factor should be given. The same principle
applies to the third sub-factor, detriment to the debtor if the contract is retained.
Along this same vein, what obligations a licensor or lessor must continue to
fulfill can also have an impact on whether or not a termination of a contract is
beneficial. When obligations are high, it is a greater benefit to terminate the contract
than when obligations are low. Similarly, when obligations are high, the detriment
of retaining a contract is likely to be higher than when obligations are low.
3. Detriment to the Non-Debtor if the Agreement is Terminated
The third factor should guarantee that policies underlying contracts regarding
the non-debtor are considered.
It is important to consider general contract
considerations, even in bankruptcy proceedings.144 One of the cornerstones of society
in this nation is that people feel comfortable entering into contracts because of the

141 BANKRUPTCY, § 2.4.1 at 461–62 (explaining that remedies in bankruptcy are generally
limited to monetary damages, except in cases where specific performance cannot be converted to
monetary damages because the contract involves something unique).
142 See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
143 Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 792 (1987) (discussing that
one policy of bankruptcy is to allow rejection of contracts which benefits the bankrupt estate by
allowing it to limit damages and still get out of contracts, thereby helping the bankrupt business to
survive).
144 See id. at 778 (discussing that bankruptcy is a sub-part of contracts between parties).
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reasonable expectations that one has when entering into a contract.145 If one party
can breach a contract and the non-breaching party that has spent money for the
purpose of the contract is only allowed nominal damages, a strong disincentive to
enter into contracts is created.146
Again, a subset of factors should be employed to determine the extent of
detriment the non-debtor will incur if the agreement is terminated. These factors
include: (1) the actions taken towards fulfilling the license or lease, (2) the impact of
the non-debtor’s loss of rights if the contract is unilaterally terminated by the debtor,
and (3) the alternative options available to the non-debtor if the contract is
terminated. It is a huge disincentive to enter into a contract when one party can
breach a contract and the non-breaching party who has spent money for the purpose
of the contract, is only allowed nominal damages. This sub-test is a measure of how
severe the detriment is to a non-debtor if the rejection of a contract is treated as
terminated.
4. Intent of the Debtor
The fourth factor is present because courts often consider intent of the debtor
and trustee when determining whether or not to allow rejection. A debtor’s intent in
rejecting the agreement is also important to ensure the debtor is terminating the
license in good faith.147 Courts have the power to stop rejections by the debtor that
are done in bad faith.148 This factor is not dispositive, but this factor should weigh
against a debtor who tries to terminate the agreement in bad-faith.
5. Balancing the Factors
The “rejection” test, with the additional considerations for interests of the debtor
and non-debtor separately, supplements the existing Bankruptcy Code and case law.
145 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1.1 (Matthew Bender ed. 2013) (“The
Main Purpose of Contract Law Is the Realization of Reasonable Expectations Induced by Promises”).
146 Lon L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: I, 46 YALE
L.J. 52, 61–62 (1936). The authors state:

Agreements can accomplish little, either for their makers or for society, unless they are
made the basis for action. When business agreements are not only made but are also
acted on, the division of labor is facilitated, goods find their way to the places where they
are most needed, and economic activity is generally stimulated. These advantages would
be threatened by any rule which limited legal protection to the reliance interest.
Id.

147 See, e.g., In re Trans World Airlines, Inc., 261 B.R. 103, 121 (Bankr. D. Del. 2001) (“A
debtor’s decision to reject an executory contract must be summarily affirmed unless it is the product
of ‘bad faith, or whim or caprice.’”) (quoting In re Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 72 B.R. 845, 849–
50 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1987)).
148 Id. at 121; In re Chipwich, Inc., 54 B.R. 427, 430–31 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985) (“[T]he debtor’s
business judgment should not be interfered with, absent a showing of bad faith or abuse of business
discretion.”). However, if the debtor or trustee has sought rejection in bad-faith, this factor weighs
against allowing the rejection to be considered a termination of the contract.

[13:621 2014]

A Solution-Based Approach to
Rejecting Trademark Licenses in Bankruptcy

647

The first factor is a threshold factor for the test. If the first factor is not satisfied,
then none of the rest needs to be considered. The second and third factors allow the
policy considerations underlying each version of the “rejection” interpretation to be
weighed against each other before deciding whether to allow a debtor to terminate a
non-debtor’s rights automatically through rejection. Neither factor should be
dispositive. Finally, the fourth factor ensures that the intent of the debtor in
rejecting the agreement is done in good faith. If the debtor rejects the agreement in
bad faith, this factor will heavily weigh in favor of letting the non-debtor decide
whether to terminate or maintain the agreement.
6. Additional Factors for Trademark Licenses
Trademark licenses are one candidate for the above “rejection” test. However,
the quality control requirement of trademark law warrants further consideration. If
the “rejection” test factors weigh in favor of treating the rejection as termination of
rights in the contract, quality control over the trademark will become the sole
responsibility of the trademark owner again. This means that quality control
becomes irrelevant for the context of bankruptcy in this situation. However, if the
“rejection” test factors weigh in favor of treating the rejection as merely a breach,
quality control still requires consideration because at the time of rejection the
licensee is still allowed to use the trademark.
Additional factors for quality control should be considered before determining
whether to treat a debtor’s trademark license rejection as merely a breach of
contract. These factors include: (1) what role the debtor and non-debtor have in
assuring quality control; (2) the length and type of relationship between the debtor
and non-debtor; and (3) the ability of the debtor and trustee to oversee quality control
matters during the bankruptcy proceedings. These factors address Congress’
primary concern regarding quality control that led to the exclusion of trademarks
from the Bankruptcy Code’s definition of intellectual property.149
As long as there is sufficient evidence or assurance that quality control will be
maintained, then quality control concerns are no greater than they were prior to the
debtor entering bankruptcy. However, if there is insufficient evidence and assurance
that quality control will be maintained, this weighs strongly against the licensee
being able to stop termination of the trademark agreement. Including factors for
quality control into the overall determination of whether an agreement should be
terminated essentially eliminates the legislative concern over quality control issues.
7. The STARBUCKS™ Hypothetical Revisited
For an example of application of the “rejection” test, consider the
STARBUCKS™ hypothetical from Section I. The threshold factor of an agreement
being a license or lease is met because the STARBUCKS™-UCM contract is for a
trademark license. The second factor, the benefit to the debtor, weighs in favor of
STARBUCKS™ because it entered into an exclusive license with the UCM. An
149

REPORT 100-505, supra note 41.
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exclusive license prevents STARBUCKS™ from entering into an agreement with the
larger manufacturer, which prevents it from earning more in royalties. However,
STARBUCKS™ would only be obligated to let the UCM continue to use the
trademark for the agreement term.
The third factor weighs heavily in favor of the UCM because the UCM would be
estopped from selling the items it already manufactured under the STARBUCKS™
name. The UCM had already fulfilled its obligations to produce the STARBUCKS™
products, and only had to pay royalties for the remainder of the agreement. The
fourth factor goes against STARBUCKS™ because it wanted to terminate the
contract solely to enter into a more profitable contract and it gave no option to the
UCM to sell its already made goods.
Next, the factors are weighed against each other. While STARBUCKS™ would
make more profit off a new contract, it still makes a profit off the existing contract
with the UCM, so the overall detriment to STARBUCKS™ is not great. On the other
hand, ending the UCM’s right to use the trademark results in a huge loss to the
UCM.
As the contract involves a trademark license, the additional factors
concerning trademarks will also be taken into consideration. So long as there are
adequate assurances that quality control could be maintained through the
bankruptcy proceedings, a court would decide that rejection of this contract could not
result in an automatic termination of the contract. Instead, STARBUCKS™ would
need to go through a prescribed alternative route of the Bankruptcy Code to try and
terminate or change provisions in the license.150
An advantage to a test-based approach to the “rejection” conundrum is that the
“rejection” problem is shifted away from trying to come to a consensus on the
meaning of “rejection,” and instead allows lower courts to determine whether
automatic termination is warranted for license and lease agreements. It also
removes the burden of having to wait for a Supreme Court decision or Congressional
definition. Instead, lower courts can begin unifying decisions and help ensure that
outcomes are taking into consideration both the circumstances of the parties and the
policies underlying contracts, bankruptcy, and the area of law the contracts involve.
V. CONCLUSION
Courts are split on whether rejecting a trademark license under § 365 of the
Bankruptcy Code results in the termination of the right to use the trademark. The
root of this split lies in the interpretation of the word “rejection” by courts. It would
be best if Congress defined the word, or in the alternative, if the Supreme Court
would interpret the word so outcomes in judicial proceedings were consistent.
However, it is unlikely that either of these will occur because of inaction in both
government branches since the splits began over 25 years ago. The proposed solution
is to employ a multi-factor test that takes into consideration concerns of all parties
involved in the suit and the competing policies underlying bankruptcy, contract, and
trademark laws.

150 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544–51 (2012) (giving the avoiding powers that a trustee has during a
bankruptcy proceeding).

